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Policymakers have a variety of instruments at their disposal when pursuing emis-
sions reduction objectives. Traditionally, regulators have relied upon “command-
and-control” (CAC) approaches involving prescriptive emissions limits or pollution 
control technology standards. Increasingly, however, emissions trading programs 
are the preferred policy choice. In the United States, the Clean Air Act Amendments 
(CAAAs) of 1990 initiated a monumental shift away from CAC regulation towards 
more market-based alternatives such as emissions trading.1 In parts of Europe, New 
Zealand, and regions of the United States, greenhouse gas regulations have helped 
to bring so-called “cap and trade” to the fore.
Despite this prominence, questions remain about how emissions trading is work-
ing in practice. First, can these market-based programs reduce emissions beyond 
1 The CAAAs authorized the use of economic incentive regulation for the control of acid rain, the development 
of cleaner burning gasoline, the reduction of toxic air emissions, and for states to use in controlling carbon mon-
oxide and urban ozone.
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what could be achieved with more prescriptive CAC regulation? A perceived 
advantage of market-based approaches over CAC is that they can, in some circum-
stances, deliver more significant public health and environmental benefits because 
lower compliance costs and greater compliance flexibility make more stringent 
emissions reductions politically feasible (US EPA 1992; Keohane, Revesz, and 
Stavins 1998; Ellerman 2006; Tietenberg 2006). Although this hypothesis seems 
plausible, it has been difficult to test empirically (Stavins 1998; Ellerman 2004; 
Harrington and Morgenstern 2007).
Second, some have expressed concern that a reliance on permit markets (ver-
sus prescriptive regulations and standards) to coordinate pollution abatement activ-
ity can lead to environmental injustice (Solomon and Lee 2000; Vandenbergh and 
Ackerly 2007; Kaswan 2008).2 If polluting facilities can achieve compliance by 
purchasing permits versus reducing emissions, there is the possibility that permitted 
pollution will flow into areas where poor or minority populations live. As detailed 
below, these environmental justice concerns are fueling heated opposition to emis-
sions trading at the state and federal level.3
We examine these two issues in the context of a renowned emissions market: the 
REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM). Our primary objective is to 
identify the causal effects of this emissions trading program on facility-level emissions 
vis-à-vis the CAC regulations it replaced. Our essential challenge is to construct a 
credible benchmark, a precise and believable estimate of the emissions we would have 
observed in the absence of the program. Design features unique to RECLAIM facili-
tate the construction of this counterfactual. More specifically, we can exploit the fact 
that only a subset of industrial facilities located in nonattainment counties in California 
were removed from a CAC regime and required to participate in RECLAIM.
The RECLAIM program marked many firsts for emissions trading. It was the 
first mandatory trading program to supplant a preexisting CAC regime that was, 
in theory, capable of achieving the same environmental objectives. It was the first 
program to include a broad and diverse population of sources, making it particularly 
relevant to future trading programs which are likely to be more heterogeneous to 
achieve increasingly aggressive air quality and climate goals.4 Illaudably, it was also 
the first emissions trading program to be challenged on the grounds of environmen-
tal injustice and noncompliance.
Our analysis of the RECLAIM program is motivated by three observations. 
First, a recent resurgence of interest in RECLAIM makes our study both timely 
and appropriate. Cap-and-trade programs have figured prominently in regional and 
federal proposals for addressing climate change, thus drawing increased attention 
to past experiences with market-based instruments in general, and RECLAIM in 
particular. Recent attempts to extract constructive insights from the RECLAIM 
experience have arrived at very different conclusions. Whereas some regard the 
2 Although a broad literature examines environmental justice concerns with respect to plant siting, CAC regula-
tion, and neighborhood location choices (see, for example, Banzhaf and Walsh 2008), few papers assess the envi-
ronmental justice effects of emissions trading.
3 Among environmental justice advocates, concerns about greenhouse gas emissions trading pertain to 
 copollutants. Whereas greenhouse gases are a global pollutant (damages do not depend on the spatial location of 
the source), copollutants, and associated damages, can be local.
4 For example, under the auspices of Assembly Bill 32, California is preparing to implement a greenhouse gas 
emissions trading program that covers large industrial sources of greenhouse gas emissions.
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program as a clear success (Stavins 2008), others see a “spectacular” failure 
(Green, Hayward, and Hassett 2007).5
Second, axiomatic questions about the effectiveness in reducing pollution of mar-
ket-based programs relative to more traditional CAC regulations remain controver-
sial and unresolved. Compared to the previous literature addressing these questions 
(see, for example, Harrington and Morgenstern 2007), we take a fundamentally dif-
ferent approach.6 We exploit the participation requirements of the RECLAIM pro-
gram in order to construct semiparametric estimates of program impacts. Emissions 
trajectories at RECLAIM facilities are compared with those at similar California 
facilities that are exempt from RECLAIM. One important advantage of this approach 
is that it mitigates—or eliminates—the potentially confounding effects of changing 
economic conditions at the state level, industrywide production trends, and techno-
logical change.
Finally, our empirical framework facilitates an analysis of how RECLAIM-
induced changes in emissions are distributed across communities with different 
socioeconomic characteristics. For a number of reasons, the RECLAIM market has 
been the most criticized of any emissions trading program with respect to environ-
mental justice concerns. Some contend that RECLAIM has placed a disproportion-
ate burden of the region’s air pollution in low-income, minority communities (Drury 
et al. 1999; Moore 2004; Lejano and Hirose 2005). We combine semiparametric 
matching methods with parametric regression techniques. This allows us to examine 
correlations between RECLAIM-induced emissions changes and socioeconomic 
neighborhood characteristics with unprecedented precision.
Our results indicate that emissions at RECLAIM facilities have fallen by approxi-
mately 20 percent, on average, relative to control facilities (i.e., similar California 
facilities that remained subject to command-and-control regulation over the duration 
of the study period). These results are robust to alternative estimation methods, func-
tional form specifications, and different control group composition. Furthermore, we 
fail to reject the hypothesis that pollution reductions under RECLAIM were equally 
distributed across neighborhoods with different socioeconomic characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides background on Southern 
California’s RECLAIM program, emphasizing past experiences with program evalu-
ation and environmental justice issues in particular. Section II describes the research 
design and econometric approach. Section III summarizes the data. Section IV pres-
ents the empirical findings. Section V concludes.
5 Stavins (2008) summarizes domestic experience with emissions trading and reports that the RECLAIM 
program has generated significant environmental benefits “with N O x emissions in the regulated area falling by 
60 percent.” Green, Hayward, and Hassett (2007) discuss the relative strengths and weaknesses of greenhouse gas 
emissions trading relative to a carbon tax. While reflecting upon past experiences with the former approach, they 
note that: “additional pitfalls and dilemmas of emissions trading can be seen through a review of the spectacular 
trading failure of the RECLAIM.” They go on to argue that although “SCAQMD estimated that S O 2 and N O x 
would be reduced by fourteen and eighty tons per day, respectively, … RECLAIM never came close to operating 
as predicted.”
6 Both Stavins (1998) and Ellerman (2004) note that, in the context of comprehensive cap-and-trade programs 
such as the Acid Rain Program, it has been difficult (if not impossible) to construct credible estimates of the 
emissions that would have been observed under a different regulatory regime. Harrington et al. (2004) compare 
outcomes from controlling similar pollutants in the United States and Europe using different policy instruments. 
The limitation of this approach is that differences in outcomes across the two contexts likely reflect social, cultural, 
political, and economic differences, in addition to differences in regulatory regimes.
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I. Background on RECLAIM
In this section, we introduce Southern California’s RECLAIM program and pro-
vide some background on two areas of emphasis: the measurement of the emissions 
impacts of RECLAIM and related environmental justice concerns.
A. A Brief History of the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
Los Angeles suffers from some of the worst air quality in the nation.7 The South 
Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) is the government agency 
responsible for regulating air pollution in the Los Angeles basin. In 1989, SCAQMD 
introduced an aggressive set of rules and standards for stationary sources. Industry 
representatives fiercely opposed these rules on the grounds that compliance costs 
would prove excessive.
In 1990, Congress turned its attention to the widespread failure of US cities to 
attain health-based national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). Under the 1990 
CAAAs, federal N O x standards were significantly revised. Because SCAQMD was 
much further from attainment compared to other air basins, the district was given 
more time to comply. Although required reductions in ozone concentration levels were 
larger for the Los Angeles basin compared to other nonattainment areas in California, 
the required rates of concentration reductions over time were quite similar.8
The CAAAs also provided general authorization for states to use market-based 
regulatory programs to achieve federal standards. Market-based approaches to pol-
lution regulation were endorsed on the grounds that CAC approaches were insuffi-
cient to address the worst of the nation’s air quality problems, and that market-based 
approaches offered a “historic opportunity to help reconcile the nation’s economic 
and environmental aspirations” (US EPA 1992). While the use of economic incen-
tives to achieve air quality standards was discretionary in most cases, it was required 
in extreme nonattainment areas, e.g., Los Angeles.9
SCAQMD responded by replacing over 40 prescriptive rules, which had 
been so opposed by industry, with a market-based emissions trading program: 
RECLAIM.10 This program was approved by state and federal regulators on 
the grounds that it would deliver emissions reductions equivalent to—or greater 
than—what would have been achieved under the subsumed command-and-control 
provisions, and would help to bring the region into compliance with federal stan-
dards by the 2010 deadline.
7 Air pollution problems are due in part to meteorological and topographical conditions; the basin is sunny, 
warm, and poorly ventilated. The dense population, large number of vehicles, and high levels of industrial activity 
also contribute significantly to the problem. In 1988, ozone levels in the Los Angeles air basin exceeded state stan-
dards on 148 days (California Air Resources Board air quality data statistics accessed May 15, 2008. http://www.
arb.ca.gov/adam/php_files/aqdphp/sc8start.php). Prior to the introduction of RECLAIM, estimates of health-related 
losses due to the poor environmental quality in the region were approaching $10 billion per year (Hall et al. 1992).
8 Section IVC characterizes the CAAA compliance requirements in more detail.
9 Pursuant to Sections 182 and 187, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final rule and guid-
ance on Economic Incentive Programs (40, part 51, Subpart U) which outlined requirements for establishing EIPs. 
States or governing bodies in extreme ozone nonattainment areas were required to design and implement economic 
incentive programs (51.492, 182(g)5).
10 Although both N O x and S O 2 emissions are capped under the program, the emphasis was on limiting N O x emis-
sions, which are an important precursor to ozone formation.
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At its inception in 1994, RECLAIM included 392 facilities whose combined 
N O x emissions accounted for over 65 percent of the region’s stationary N O x emissions 
(Zerlauth and Schubert 1999). Almost all facilities in the SCAQMD with annual N O x 
or S O 2 emissions of four tons or more are included in the program.11 Public facilities 
(such as police and firefighting facilities) were categorically excluded. Sources emit-
ting less than four tons per year remained subject to command-and-control programs.
A RECLAIM trading credit (RTC) confers the right to emit one pound of emis-
sions within a 12-month period. At the outset of the program, facilities were 
informed of how many permits they would be allocated gratis each year through 
2010.12 These RTCs were distributed based on firms’ historical fuel consumption 
and predetermined production technology characteristics.13 Figure 1 plots the aggre-
gate allocation trajectory over time (the solid line).14 N O x emissions permitted under 
RECLAIM were reduced by over 70 percent over the first ten years of the program. 
By the end of 2003, the aggregate permit allocation reached the level of emissions 
that the subsumed rules and control measures were intended to achieve by 2010.
Early on, most firms found they had an excess of credits (the dashed line in 
Figure 1 represents aggregate tons of N O x emissions). The aggregate cap did not 
start to bind until 1999 (SCAQMD 2001). Figure 1 helps to illustrate this “cross-
over” point. While it is clear that emissions permits were initially overallocated, 
many believe that generous permit allocations in the early years of the program were 
necessary to engender political support for the program (US EPA 2002).15 Because 
permits cannot be banked, impacts of the initial overallocation were confined to the 
early stages of RECLAIM.
Figure 1 also plots the trend in average RTC prices (the dotted line). In the first 
five years of the program, prices for N O x RTCs remained relatively low, as expect-
ed.16 However, the increase in prices following the crossover was much larger than 
anticipated; the price of N O x RTCs increased from approximately $2,000 per ton in 
January of 2000 to over $120,000 per ton in March of 2001.
During the California electricity crisis, production levels at electricity generat-
ing facilities in the RECLAIM program increased significantly. Emissions at these 
11 Of these, 73 percent can be classified as manufacturing firms, 13 percent are involved in communication, 
transportation, or utilities, 2 percent are involved in construction, 3 percent are operating in the service sector, 
6 percent in wholesale trade, 2 percent are retail establishments, and the remaining 3 percent can be classified as 
government facilities.
12 RTCs cannot be banked; a permit can be used to certify only emissions occurring within the 12-month period 
with which the permit is associated. For emissions in any quarter, firms can use permits expiring either in June or in 
December. See Holland and Moore (forthcoming).
13 The RTC allocation methodology is described in detail in SCAQMD Rule 2002 ( http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/
siprules/sr2002.pdf).
14 Section III includes a detailed description of these data.
15 Nonetheless, RECLAIM may have changed firms’ production and investment decisions in this early period. 
A firm making a long-lived investment may have abated early in anticipation of higher future prices. Furthermore, 
RECLAIM relaxed a vintage differentiated regulation, New Source Review, that has limited firms’ abilities to mod-
ify facilities. For example, only Best Available Control Technology (BACT) is required, and necessary offsets can 
be demonstrated with RTCs. RECLAIM annual reports show a very high rate of NSR activity. From 1994 to 2006, 
the reports show that on average 47 RECLAIM facilities had NSR activity per year. In contrast, the Committee on 
Changes in New Source Review Programs for Stationary Sources of Air Pollution (2006) reports that on average 
125 NSR permits per year were issued for the entire country from 1997 to 2002 for N O x .
16 Before RECLAIM began, it was predicted that trading in the market would be slow at first because of the 
initial surplus of permits. In 1994, SCAQMD economists predicted that prices for N O x RTCs would average around 
$577/ton in 1995 and rise to approximately $1,100/ton by 1999 (Miller, Michael. 1994. “Firms Can Earn Credits 
for Keeping Emissions Down, Then Sell Them.” The San Francisco Examiner. January 9, 1994: B1).
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facilities exceeded permit allocations, which in turn led to a sharp increase in RTC 
prices.17 In May 2001, the RECLAIM rules were amended in an effort to stabilize 
the RTC market. The rule amendments (Rule 2009) removed 14 power producers 
from the RECLAIM market. These facilities were required to pay a fee of $15,000 
per ton of emissions in excess of their allocation. They were also required to install 
the “best available” control technologies on existing power generating units by the 
end of 2004.18 In 2007, these large power producers reentered the RECLAIM pro-
gram as unrestricted market participants.
By 2002, monthly average prices had fallen below $2,000 per ton N O x . Regulators 
were concerned that low permit prices were failing to provide sufficient incentives 
for facilities to install pollution control technologies that would be needed to bring 
the region into compliance with federal standards. In September of 2004,  restrictions 
on power producers were made more stringent, and the aggregate RTC allocation for 
compliance years 2007–2011 was reduced by an additional 20 percent.
B. RECLAIM program Evaluation
Because RECLAIM represented such a major departure from the traditional 
regulatory approach, both federal and state agencies required extensive program 
evaluation and oversight. Emissions trading program evaluation is particularly chal-
lenging. Because industrial emissions are influenced by numerous factors,  attributing 
changes in emissions patterns to specific policy interventions is difficult. These 
17 Kolstad and Wolak (2003) provide evidence that some electricity producers in SCAQMD intentionally pur-
chased N O x RTCs at higher than competitive prices so as to be able to artificially increase electricity prices.
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Figure 1
Note: Trends in nitrogen oxides emissions (dashed), allocations (solid), and permit price (dotted).
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challenges notwithstanding, agencies in charge of overseeing RECLAIM remain 
committed to evaluating the emissions impacts of the program.
Unresolved disagreements about what constitutes an appropriate measure of coun-
terfactual emissions have resulted in a plurality of opinions regarding RECLAIM’s 
overall performance. After 15 years of program evaluations, the emissions impacts 
of RECLAIM vis-à-vis the subsumed CAC rules remain controversial. Federal poli-
cymakers and other stakeholders have expressed frustration over the lack of con-
sensus emerging from RECLAIM program evaluations, noting that the public is 
entitled to “real world information and practical comparisons in order to judge for 
itself whether the program is living up to their needs and expectations” (US EPA 
2002). Online Appendix A summarizes some of the contradictory evidence provided 
by past program evaluations and reports.
C. Environmental Justice and Emissions Trading
The term “environmental injustice” refers to any disproportionate human health or 
environmental impact on minority or low-income populations.19 Empirical research 
conducted in the 1980s demonstrated significantly higher levels of exposure to envi-
ronmental hazards in traditionally disadvantaged communities.20 Subsequent work 
has brought more sophisticated empirical methods to bear on this issue (Banzhaf 
and Walsh 2008).
Kaswan (2008) provides a detailed discussion of the perceived tensions between 
environmental justice and emissions trading. A dominant concern is that emissions 
trading programs fail to account for the distribution of pollution damages, whereas 
permitting under the CAAAs can explicitly consider environmental justice concerns. 
If polluting facilities can purchase permits instead of reducing emissions, it is pos-
sible for permitted pollution to flow into areas where poor or minority populations 
live, thereby exacerbating preexisting inequalities in the distribution of environ-
mental risks. On the other hand, market-based programs could mitigate preexisting 
environmental justice problems. If polluting facilities with relatively low marginal 
abatement costs are disproportionately located in traditionally disadvantaged neigh-
borhoods, an efficient permit market should ensure that a larger share of the man-
dated emissions reductions will be achieved in these areas (Burtraw et al. 2005).21
For a number of reasons, the RECLAIM market has been the most scrutinized of 
any emissions trading program with respect to environmental justice issues (Chinn 
1999; Drury et al. 1999; Moore 2004; Lejano and Hirose 2005). First, the Los Angeles 
area is home to an exceptionally diverse population. Past studies have documented that 
race and ethnicity have historically played a “persistent explanatory role” in the distri-
bution of environmental health risks in Southern California (Morello-Frosch, Pastor, 
and Sadd 2001). Second, N O x is a nonuniformly mixed pollutant. This means that 
there is potential for significant spatial variation in damages from N O x emissions, and 
19 Executive Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. (1995) Reprinted as Amended in 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1994 and Supp. IV 
1998).
20 See, for example, GAO (1983), United Church of Christ (1987), and Brown (1995).
21 Past studies looking at the distributional impacts of emissions trading have looked closely at the Acid Rain 
Program. These studies find no evidence of disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects on minority, low-income, or other populations (EPA 2005; Shadbegian, Gray, and Morgan 2007).
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thus potential for environmental injustice.22 Third, the RECLAIM program was indi-
rectly implicated in another highly controversial rule promulgated by SCAQMD that 
allowed stationary sources to offset their uncontrolled emissions of volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs) using mobile source emissions reduction credits.23 Although the 
links between RECLAIM and this controversial rule were indirect, the RECLAIM 
program has since been associated with environmental injustice allegations.24
Concerns about environmental justice have strongly influenced the debate sur-
rounding California’s greenhouse gas regulations (Hanemann 2008; Sze et al. 
2009). Regulatory activities in California under A.B. 32 constitute the most ambi-
tious and comprehensive effort to control GHG emissions currently under way in the 
United States. Prominent environmental justice advocates have come out in strong 
opposition to cap and trade in California due to concerns about mercury, benzene, 
and other copollutants. They cite RECLAIM as a “well documented” example of 
how emissions trading can disproportionately harm communities of color (Drury 
2009).25 Citizens groups filing a lawsuit in 2011 to prevent greenhouse gas emis-
sions trading in California alleged that “All the evidence show(s) that cap-and-trade 
programs have failed environmental justice communities” (Sweet 2011).
II. Research Design
Previous estimates of the emissions effects of RECLAIM are conditional on, and 
highly sensitive to, controversial assumptions about what emissions would have 
been in the absence of the program. In this study, we exploit some unique design fea-
tures of the RECLAIM program in order to construct more tenable and  transparent 
estimates of counterfactual emissions. Rather than rely on ex ante expectations 
about what aggregate emissions trajectories would have been absent RECLAIM, 
we use econometrically adjusted ex post observed emissions at facilities that were 
subject to CAC regulation over the same time period. In what follows, we introduce 
our empirical framework and identification strategy.
A. Empirical Framework
Building on the potential outcome framework that is now standard in the pro-
gram evaluation literature, we postulate that there are two regulatory states to which 
California’s industrial N O x emitters could have been assigned: the market-based 
22 In the interest of avoiding “hotspots,” RECLAIM was designed as a zonal trading system. The SCAQMD was 
divided into two zones: the region along the coast, and an inland region. Facilities along the coast (where pollu-
tion problems tend to be more severe) may purchase RTCs only from other coastal facilities. Inland facilities can 
purchase permits from either inland or coastal facilities.
23 Environmental justice groups challenged this rule as violating the Civil Rights Act by allowing reductions in 
mobile source emissions to be substituted for VOC reductions at point sources located in minority communities. 
The lawsuit was withdrawn by the plaintiffs. See “CBE Sues SCAQMD Over Amendments to Car Scrapping Rule,” 
California Environmental Insider: 12 (7), September 15, 1998. In 2003, a second lawsuit alleged RECLAIM vio-
lated the Clean Air Act. SCAQMD agreed to establish a million-dollar fund to reduce emissions in environmental 
justice communities in the Los Angeles area. See Our Children’s Earth, News Release, March 23, 2004.
24 The RECLAIM program, as it was originally designed, permitted the use of mobile source credits to achieve 
compliance. This mobile source credit compliance option was rarely used. Mobile source credits represented less 
than 0.02 percent of the total allocation of N O x permits.
25 See online Appendix C for a more detailed discussion of these arguments.
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RECLAIM program or the CAC regime that prevails in nonattainment counties out-
side of SCAQMD (and which the SCAQMD continues to use to regulate smaller 
emitters). Let  D i = 1 if the i th facility is included in RECLAIM (i.e., the facility is 
“treated” ). Let  D i = 0 if facility i remains subject to CAC regulation throughout the 
duration of our study. Potential outcomes  Y it (1) and  Y it (0) denote annual emissions 
at facility i at time t conditional on participation and nonparticipation, respectively.
We are primarily interested in estimating the sample average treatment effect on 
the treated (SATT):
(1)  α T T = E [ Y it′ (1) −  Y it′ (0) |  D i = 1],
where t′ represents a year following the introduction of the RECLAIM program and 
α T T measures the average effect of the RECLAIM program on annual facility level 
N O x emissions.26
Emissions at both treated and untreated facilities are observed prior to the 
RECLAIM program (i.e., when all facilities in California’s nonattainment areas 
were subject to CAC regulation) and over several years following the introduction 
of the program. Facility-level emissions data collected from RECLAIM partici-
pants during years following the introduction of the program can be used to identify 
E[ Y it′ (1) |  D i = 1]. However, [ Y it′ (0) |  D i = 1] is not observed. We will construct esti-
mates of these counterfactual outcomes using emissions observed at control facili-
ties subject to CAC regulation for the duration of the time period.
Incomplete program participation requirements provide us with two potential 
comparison groups. First, the RECLAIM program applies only to major sources 
located within SCAQMD. Thousands of California facilities located outside the Los 
Angeles air basin are subject to more traditional CAC. Second, hundreds of smaller 
emitters within SCAQMD remain subject to more traditional CAC rules.
The simplest and most naive estimate of  α T T is obtained by computing an uncon-
ditional difference-in-differences. This estimator will be biased if factors that are 
related to facility-level emissions dynamics vary significantly across the treatment 
and comparison groups. In order to reduce the bias potentially introduced by observ-
able differences across RECLAIM participants and nonparticipants, we employ two 
strategies that condition on observable covariates.
Regression-Based Conditioning Strategies.—Ordinary least squares (OLS) can 
be used to control for factors other than regulatory regime that affect facility-level 
emissions trajectories. We estimate the following simple specification:
(2)  Y it′ −  Y i t 0  = β′  X i + α  D i +  ε i ,
where  X i is a vector of observable covariates and  t 0 denotes the time period prior to 
the introduction of RECLAIM. This approach implicitly assumes that the variables 
in X are exogenous to treatment status. In our case, these variables will include 
facility-level emissions before RECLAIM was introduced, four-digit industry 
26 We will also evaluate program impacts in percentage terms, although we will emphasize (1) as a more infor-
mative measure of the average effect of RECLAIM on industry emissions.
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 classification, county-level attainment status, and pretreatment, facility specific eco-
nomic and demographic measures. The parameter α captures the average effect of 
the RECLAIM program on changes in facility-level emissions over time conditional 
on variables in X. The error term  ε i is assumed to be independent of the covariates 
in  X i and the treatment indicator  D i .
There are several potential problems with this approach. First, if there is only lim-
ited overlap in the distributions of X across the treatment and control groups and func-
tional form assumptions are incorrect, missing outcomes will be incorrectly imputed. 
Estimates of average treatment effects can also be biased if control observations are 
not appropriately reweighted to control for differences in the distribution of the X 
variables over regions common to the control and treatment groups. In the interest of 
mitigating these potential biases, we turn to semiparametric matching estimators.
Semiparametric Conditioning Strategies.—Matching estimators are an extension 
of standard regression approaches. One clear advantage is that parametric assump-
tions about the relationship between the outcome variable and the covariates in X 
can be avoided. Our general approach to matching follows Heckman, Ichimura, and 
Todd (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) who introduce the following generalized 
DID matching estimator:
(3)  ̂  α DID =  1 _  N 1 
  ∑ 
j∈  1 
 
 
  { ( Y jt′ (1) −  Y j t 0  (0)) −  ∑ 
k∈  0 
 
 
 w jk ( Y kt′ (0) −  Y k t 0  (0))}.
Here,   1 denotes the set of program participants,   0 denotes the set of nonpartici-
pants, and  N 1 is the number of facilities in the treatment group. The participants are 
indexed by j; the nonparticipants are indexed by k. The weight placed on facility k 
when constructing the counterfactual estimate for treated facility j is  w jk . Our nearest 
neighbor matching estimator weights control facilities according to their similarity 
to treated facilities where similarity is based on X.
B. Identifying Assumptions
Our most important identifying assumption is that the biases in the unconditional 
DID estimates can be removed by adjusting for differences in observable covari-
ates. More formally, we assume that the distribution of the control outcome  Y it′ (0), 
conditional on observable facility and neighborhood characteristics (such as historic 
emissions, industry classification, county attainment status), is the same among 
participating and nonparticipating facilities. If this conditional unconfoundedness 
assumption is satisfied, once we adjust for observable differences, we can inter-
pret differences in observed outcomes as the effect of RECLAIM versus the CAC 
regimes of other California air basins.
In our context, we also invoke a stronger variant of the unconfoundedness assump-
tion. In order to interpret (3) as an estimate of the effect of RECLAIM on emissions 
vis-à-vis what would have been observed under the status quo, it must be that trends 
in the stringency of the control treatment (i.e., the CAC regulations to which the 
control facilities are subjected) follow the trajectory that the SCAQMD CAC regime 
would have taken absent RECLAIM.
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Our estimation strategy also requires that the support of the distribution of the 
conditioning covariates in the treatment group overlaps the support of the distribu-
tion of these covariates in the comparison group.
Finally, in order to rule out spillovers and general equilibrium effects, it must also 
be the case that potential outcomes at one facility are independent of the treatment 
status of other facilities. We refer to this subsequently as the stable unit treatment 
value assumption (SUTVA).
Some of these assumptions can be directly tested. For instance, it is straight-
forward to demonstrate that the overlap condition is satisfied by simply looking 
at the joint distributions of the covariates in the treated and control groups. Other 
assumptions, including unconfoundedness and SUTVA, are not testable in prin-
ciple. However, we will conduct indirect tests in order to evaluate the plausibility 
of these assumptions.
C. Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Thus far, we have been exclusively concerned with estimating the average effect of 
RECLAIM on facility-level emissions. We are also interested in investigating whether 
treatment effects vary systematically across facilities located in neighborhoods with dif-
ferent socioeconomic characteristics. We estimate the following weighted regression:
(4)  Y it′ −  Y i t 0  =  δ j + β′  X i + θ′  X i  D i + α  D i +  ε i ,
where the  δ j are group-specific fixed effects and group j comprises treated facil-
ity j and its  m j closest matches. What distinguishes this approach from more stan-
dard regression-based strategies is that observations are weighted as in matching. 
To investigate the extent to which emissions trading has exacerbated (or mitigated) 
environmental injustice vis-à-vis CAC regulations, socioeconomic and demographic 
variables are included in  X i .
III. Data
About 10,000 polluting facilities in California report annual emissions of crite-
ria pollutants to the California Air Resources Board (ARB). All polluting facilities 
are required to report to their local Air Quality Management District. The ARB 
maintains a database of emissions reports from these local districts (ARB 1987–
2005). Our primary data come from this database, which also includes information 
on industry classification. We use addresses, geocodes, and industry classifications 
to ensure a consistent coding of facilities across our panel.27 We also use separate 
emissions data from RECLAIM to verify the emissions reported to the ARB data-
base (SCAQMD 2007).
27 To ensure consistent coding over time, we identify facilities with different IDs but the same address and SIC. If 
the facilities do not report emissions in more than one overlapping year, then we code the facilities with the same ID. 
To ensure consistent coding within a year, we combine facilities with different IDs but the same geocodes and SIC.
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We obtain demographics data from 1990 and 2000 Censuses at the block group 
level.28 The data include median household income, in 1989 and in 1999, and popu-
lation by ethnicity and race. We construct a measure of percent minority as the per-
cent of the population that is either non-Hispanic black or Hispanic.29 To account for 
the possibility that households can sort based on pollution exposure, we emphasize 
the 1990 data, versus the more recent 2000 data that may be endogenous to emis-
sions due to sorting (Banzhaf and Walsh 2008).
To prepare these demographics data for use in our analysis, we construct radii 
of differing lengths surrounding each facility. We determine the percent of a block 
group’s geographic area that is within a half, one, and two miles of each facility and 
use these percentages to characterize the neighborhood surrounding each facility. 
For example, for the one-mile radius, we calculate the percent of each block group 
that is within a mile of a facility. We multiply that percentage by the corresponding 
census block group populations (separately for each demographic group). We then 
aggregate over block groups to get the total number of affected individuals for that 
facility. We replicate this procedure for a half-, one-, and two-mile radius, and for 
each population subgroup. Note that this assumes a uniform geographic distribution 
of population within a block group.
Trends in Facility-Level N O x Emissions.—Figure 2 shows the declining trends 
in total N O x emissions at California facilities between 1990 and 2005. The figure 
illustrates that, in the aggregate, N O x emissions from both facilities in RECLAIM 
and those in comparison groups were declining at similar percentages prior to the 
introduction of RECLAIM. In the early years of the RECLAIM program (i.e., 
when the aggregate cap was not binding) emissions of RECLAIM facilities appear 
to increase slightly relative to facilities outside the program. After the cross-over 
point in 2000, however, the average rate of emissions decrease among RECLAIM 
facilities exceeds that of non-RECLAIM facilities. Overall, emissions among 
RECLAIM facilities have dropped 72 percent relative to pre-1993 levels, whereas 
emissions among nonparticipating facilities have dropped only 62 percent over 
the same period.
Table 1 summarizes a balanced sample of these same data. To construct this 
table, the data are partitioned into four nonoverlapping periods. Period 1 encom-
passes years prior to the introduction of the RECLAIM program (i.e., 1990–1993). 
Period 2 covers the early years of the RECLAIM program when the emissions cap 
exceeded aggregate emissions (1997–1998). Period 3 includes years immediately 
following the “cross-over” point (2001–2002). Period 4 includes the most recent 
years (2004–2005). The sample includes all facilities reporting positive emissions in 
each period. Period 1 annual facility-level emissions are similar between RECLAIM 
facilities and the comparison group. Average emissions among RECLAIM facilities 
28 US Census Bureau, 1990 and 2000. Demographic data is summarized in the online Appendix Table A1.
29 Figure A1 helps to illustrate the spatial distribution of this measure. This figure was generated using zip code–
level demographics data. In the econometric analysis we use more disaggregated (i.e., census block) data which 
should be less susceptible to aggregation issues such as the ecological fallacy and the modifiable areal unit problem.
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fell 70 percent between period 1 and period 4.30 This table also illustrates the control 
group’s annual emissions fell approximately 50 percent.
The full panel of facility-level data is unbalanced. Between periods 1 and 4, 32 per-
cent of RECLAIM facilities and close to 54 percent of non-RECLAIM facilities fail to 
report emissions in one or more years. Facility-level emissions data in a given period 
may be missing for a number of reasons, including errors in the data, a facility’s fail-
ure to report emissions in a given period, or the exit of a facility. On average, treated 
30 When the sample omits the 14 power producers removed from RECLAIM in period 3, average emissions fell 




































































Figure 2. Total NOx Emissions in RECLAIM and in the Rest of California
Table 1—Summary Statistics of NOx Emissions
Period RECLAIM Control Total
Period 1 101.8 102.8 102.6
(1990–1993) (304.4) (430.5) (411.9)
Period 2 62.7 80.0 77.1
(1997–1998) (179.8) (371.0) (346.3)
Period 3 43.8 67.9 63.8
(2001–2002) (125.4) (339.6) (314.0)
Period 4 30.8 53.0 49.2
(2004–2005) (117.1) (290.8) (269.6)
Notes: We report the summary statistics on the balanced sample of facilities with positive 
emissions in all four periods. We include the 13 RECLAIM facilities temporarily removed 
from the program. We report the mean tons of NOx emissions per facility (e.g., 101.8) as 
well as the standard deviation (304.4). There are 213 facilities in RECLAIM and 1,052 in the 
control group. The control group is restricted to facilities in the same two-digit SIC codes as 
RECLAIM facilities and that were located in counties that, during 1990 and 1993, were not in 
attainment with the one-hour ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
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facilities reporting emissions in all periods were larger emitters in period 1, although 
not significantly so.31 Section IVE discusses sample selection issues in more detail.
Industrial Composition of the Treatment and Control Groups.—Table 2 examines 
the distributions of historic, facility-level N O x emissions among treated and control 
facilities, respectively. We focus on the 12 industries which accounted for the largest 
shares of N O x emissions in period 1. While refining and electricity generation are 
the largest polluters, about 40 percent of emissions are from firms in other four-digit 
SIC codes. The final column of this table reports the proportion of RECLAIM facili-
ties with historic emissions within the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the empirical 
distribution of historic emissions among control facilities in the same industry. In 
most cases, the support of the distribution of emissions in RECLAIM is completely 
overlapped by the support of the distribution in the control group. These summary 
statistics help to highlight a limitation of our matching strategy. Ideally, we would 
like to match each treated facility with a large number of control facilities in the 
same industry to average out idiosyncratic shocks in our estimate of counterfactual 
emissions. However, in some industries, the number of control facilities with very 
similar historic emissions will be limited. This could have implications for match 
quality. We revisit this issue below.
31 Among RECLAIM participants, average period 1 emissions are 101.8 tons and 95.0 tons for “balanced” facili-
ties (i.e., those facilities reporting emissions in all four periods) and unbalanced facilities, respectively. For this 
sample, a simple regression of emissions on an indicator variable of being in the balanced sample has a standard 
error of 35.3 tons. Among the control group, these averages are 102.8 tons and 57.5 tons, respectively. These are 
statistically different as the standard error of this sample is 13.3.








Petroleum refining 37.5% 10 880 978 18 988 1,570 1
Electric services 23.9% 21 378 408 85 393 981 1
Crude petroleum/natural gas 7.1% 10 116 124 191 68 190 1
Cement 4.1% 2 699 909 9 1,885 951 1
Glass containers 3.8% 1 611 5 856 341 1
Natural gas trans. and distribution 2.3% 8 85 83 4 474 612 0.88
Paper mills 1.8% 6 82 166 5 121 170 0.83
Electric and other services  
 combined
1.6% 4 107 83 65 330 854 1
Industrial inorganic chemicals 0.9% 5 31 30 10 223 683 1
Steel works, blast furnaces 0.9% 3 103 120 4 20 36 0.66
Steam and air-conditioning  
 supply
0.9% 7 39 37 2 55 55 0.57
Products of petroleum and coal,  
 NEC
0.8% 1 260 1 580 1
Total for major industries 87% 78 288 498 399 282 768 0.96
Notes: “RECLAIM share” is the four-digit SIC industry share of initial, period 1 NOx emissions. We report sum-
mary statistics of tons of facility-level NOx emissions during period 1 for both treated and the control facilities. The 
final column reports the proportion of the treatment group that falls within the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the 
empirical distribution of period 1 NOx emissions in the corresponding SIC code class of controls.
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Emissions Changes Across Neighborhoods.—Although average N O x emissions 
at RECLAIM facilities fell by 70 percent between periods 1 and 4, this average 
could hide increases in emissions exposure in certain neighborhoods. Table 3 inves-
tigates how changes in emissions vary with demographics, as measured by the 
Table 3—Change in Emissions (tons) Weighted by Demographic Group from the 1990 Census
Actual change Relative change
Group 0.5 miles  1 mile 2 miles  0.5 miles 1 mile 2 miles






























































































































































































































































Notes: Change in emissions from period 1 to period 4. Electric facilities are included. The number of observations 
ranges from 131 to 211.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
980 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW ApRIL 2012
1990 Census. We calculate the number of individuals  N jd in demographic group d 
living near RECLAIM facility j where near is defined by the fraction of the block 
group within a given distance from facility j. Let  Δ j represent facility j ’s observed 
change in emissions from period 1 to period 4. For each demographic group, we 
measure the average change in local emissions weighted by that group’s population:
(5)  
 ∑ 
j∈ I 1 
   Δ j  N jd 
 _
 ∑ 
j∈ I 1 
   N jd 
  .
These group-specific changes are reported in the left panel of Table 3. For all three dis-
tance measures (1/2, one, and two miles), we find that all groups experienced a reduc-
tion of emissions.32 Within a half mile, high-income whites saw the largest actual 
reductions, while the group that saw the smallest reductions was low-income blacks. 
Over all races and ethnicities, high-income households experienced the largest reduc-
tions. Across all incomes, whites experienced the largest reductions in  emissions. 
The exact magnitude of the results changes depending on the distance from facili-
ties, but the findings are qualitatively similar.
In Section IV, we seek to isolate only those changes in emissions that are attribut-
able to RECLAIM (vis-à-vis CAC regulation). The right panel of Table 3 previews 
these results. These adjusted changes are smaller for all groups because the control 
group also experienced a reduction in emissions over the study period. Most impor-
tant, the relative emissions comparisons suggest that no group was exposed to more 
emissions due to emissions trading. It is still the case that the reduction in emissions 
experienced by some groups was smaller than for others. We will examine these 
results more closely in Section IVD.
IV. Results
In this section, we present our treatment effects estimates and conduct a series of 
robustness checks and falsification tests. We then test for heterogeneity in our treat-
ment effect estimates and discuss selection issues.
Our outcome of interest is the change in facility-level annual N O x emissions 
across different time periods. We report results generated using both levels and log 
transformed data. In the latter case, the SATT can be interpreted as our estimate of 
the average effect in percentage terms. Throughout, the control group is restricted 
to facilities located in counties that, like the RECLAIM counties, were not in attain-
ment with the one-hour ozone NAAQS standards in 1990 and 1993.
Recall that 14 power producers were removed from the RECLAIM market in 2001 
(period 3) but later reentered the market.33 For a long-term view of the overall effec-
tiveness of RECLAIM, we analyze changes in facility-level emissions between period 
32 Standard errors are computed by assuming the facility-level changes in emissions are i.i.d. One group did not 
have a statistically significant drop in emissions: the standard errors for high-income blacks are very large.
33 One of these, Riverside Canal Power Company, is not in our complete dataset since it was decommissioned 
shortly after the electricity crisis due to the lack of environmental controls. (See http://www.energy.ca.gov/sit-
ingcases/highgrove/documents/applicant/AFC_CD-ROM/Volume_01_AES_Highgrove_Project_AFC/8.13 
%20Waste %20Management.pdf).
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1 and period 4. Our preferred approach uses data from all RECLAIM facilities to 
estimate this model. To estimate the effect of trading in RECLAIM during the crucial 
window surrounding the price spike, we analyze changes in facility-level emissions 
between period 2 and period 3. Here, our preferred specification excludes the 14 power 
producers since they were not part of the market during that time. We discuss below 
how including or excluding these facilities changes our results and their interpretation.
A. Difference-in-Dfferences Estimates
We first use a simple linear regression framework to generate conditional DID 
estimates. Facility-level emissions changes are regressed on industry fixed effects 
and N O x emissions in period 1.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the DID estimates of the RECLAIM program’s 
impacts on long-run emissions changes are statistically significant at the  5 percent 
Table 4—Average Treatment Effect using Nearest Neighbors Matching
RECLAIM
Levels Logs facilities Controls
panel A. Change in NOx emissions between periods 1 and 4
OLS −32.58** −0.30*** 212 1,222
(13.77) (0.10)
Nearest neighbor matching −20.59*** −0.25*** 212 1,222
 (base specification) (7.63) (0.09)
Nearest neighbor matching −18.12 −0.11 211 1,191
 (alternative specification) (11.51) (0.08)
Nearest neighbor matching −14.16** −0.20** 199 1,222
 (restricted sample) (6.86) (0.09)
panel B. Change in NOx emissions between periods 2 and 3
OLS −6.84 −0.22*** 255 1,577
(6.65) (0.04)
Nearest neighbor matching −8.29** −0.26*** 255 1,577
 (base specification) (3.85) (0.06)
Nearest neighbor matching −6.18 −0.16*** 252 1,493
 (alternative specification) (5.06) (0.06)
Nearest neighbor matching −6.37 −0.23*** 268 1,577
 (unrestricted sample) (4.57) (0.06)
Notes: We define periods as averages of positive emissions in two years: 1990 and 1993 (period 
1); 1997–1998 (period 2); 2001–2002 (period 3); and 2004–2005 (period 4). All observations 
are from historic nonattainment counties. The OLS estimates control for average NOx emis-
sions during period 1 and four-digit SIC code indicator variables, with standard errors clus-
tered by air basin. For all semiparametric matching, we match on the three closest neighbors 
with linear bias adjustment in levels and quadratic bias adjustment in logs. The baseline nearest 
neighbor matching model matches on historic emissions and exactly on four-digit SIC codes. 
In the alternative specification, industry-specific emissions quartile indicators are added to the 
exact matching variables; predetermined demographic characteristics (race and income) are 
added to the matching variables. Panel A’s restricted sample omits 13 facilities removed from 
the program in 2001. Panel B’s unrestricted sample includes these facilities. For the log specifi-
cations, emissions differences are defined as ln(EmitX + 1) − ln(Emit1 + 1), and all match-
ing is on ln(Emit1 + 1). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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level. The levels estimate (−32.58 tons per year) is approximately 33 percent 
of the average annual emissions at RECLAIM facilities in period 1. Using the 
 log-transformed data, the estimate is −0.30. Looking at changes in emissions over 
the cross-over period, estimated OLS treatment effects are also negative (panel B). 
However, in levels, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero effect. In all of these 
regressions, the period 1 N O x coefficient (not reported) is statistically significant 
and negative in all specifications, indicating that historic emissions are a good pre-
dictor of emissions in later years.
B. Semiparametric Matching
The nonparametric nearest neighbor (NN) matching estimator constructs the 
counterfactual estimate for each treatment case using the control cases that most 
closely resemble the treatment cases.34 If m nearest neighbors are selected for each 
program participant, the  w jk are set equal to 1/m for the selected neighbors and zero 
for all other members of the comparison group.35 We impose a strict overlap con-
dition; only those control facilities in the same industries as RECLAIM facilities 
are included in the pool of potential controls. We also require that all facilities be 
located in ozone nonattainment areas.
Following Abadie and Imbens (2006), we augment this nonparametric matching 
estimation with a regression-based bias adjustment so as to mitigate any bias intro-
duced by poor match quality. After matching the treated facilities with m nearest 
neighbors, within-pair differences are adjusted using a parametric regression of the 
control outcome on X.36
In all of our matching, we require an exact match on the four-digit standard indus-
trial classification code. We prioritize industrial classification because these industry 
indicators are likely to be correlated with unobserved determinants of facility-level 
emissions including production technology characteristics, firm size, and demand 
for the products produced by the facility.
Our primary continuous matching variable is pretreatment (i.e., period 1) N O x 
emissions. As we note above, historic N O x emissions are a good predictor of emis-
sions in subsequent periods. Our most parsimonious specification matches on 
attainment status, SIC code, and historic N O x only. We refer to this as the base 
specification. We also experiment with matching on other observable factors that 
could conceivably be correlated with facility-level emissions trajectories such as 
the demographic and racial characteristics of the neighborhoods surrounding the 
34 Within the class of matching estimators, there are a variety of matching algorithms to choose from. 
Asymptotically, all matching estimators produce the same estimate. However, in finite samples, different matching 
estimators can yield very different treatment effect estimates, particularly if one or more of the identifying assump-
tions is violated. Alternative matching estimators are presented in online Appendix B.
35 Although a larger m reduces the expected variance of the estimate because more information is used to con-
struct the counterfactual for each participant, a large m also increases the bias of the estimate as the probability 
of making poorer matches increases. One drawback of this estimator is that all “neighbors” are equally weighted, 
regardless of their distance from the treated facility.
36 More specifically, using data from matched control facilities, we regress the dependent variable (i.e., differ-
ences in emissions) on the covariates. We then use this regression model to impute counterfactual estimates for 
all treated facilities. Note that these estimates are not likely to be sensitive to our parametric assumptions because 
regression techniques are only used to impute differences in outcomes among very similar facilities. These bias 
adjustments are discussed in more detail in online Appendix B.
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facility in 1990 and the size of the facility (as measured by number of employees). 
The larger the number of variables we use for matching, the less accurately we are 
to match on those variables for which we do not require exact matching. When we 
include additional matching covariates, we add an industry-specific emissions quar-
tile indicator to the list of exact match variables.
Table 4 reports results for the base NN specification and one alternative specifica-
tion that includes race and demographic matching variables in addition to historic 
emissions and industry classification.37 Standard error estimates are constructed 
using the variance formula of Abadie and Imbens (2006). In each case, RECLAIM 
facilities are matched to their three nearest neighbors. Online Appendix Tables A2 
and A3 demonstrate that our results are not overly sensitive to the choice of m or the 
bias adjustment.
For the overall change in emissions (panel A of Table 4), the NN estimate, 
−20.59 tons per year, is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This repre-
sents 20 percent of the average annual emissions at RECLAIM facilities in period 1. 
Using log-transformed emissions data, the estimated coefficient is −0.25, implying 
that emissions reductions declined (in percentage terms) by approximately 25 per-
cent more, on average, among RECLAIM facilities versus matched control facili-
ties.38 These estimated treatment effects are smaller (in absolute value) as compared 
with the OLS results. This suggests that differences in the distribution of covariates 
across the treatment and control group bias treatment effect estimates. When the 13 
facilities that were removed from RECLAIM in 2001 are removed from the dataset, 
our SATT estimates remain statistically significant, although the point estimates are 
smaller in absolute value.
Making the period 2–period 3 comparison (panel B), the NN estimate is −8.29 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This represents a 12 percent reduc-
tion in the average period 2 emissions at RECLAIM facilities. The SATT estimate 
using log transformed data is 0.26. Notably, when we include in our sample the 13, 
major polluting facilities that were removed from the RECLAIM program in 2001, 
estimated level impacts fall and cease to be statistically significant. However, in the 
log specification, these large emitters are relatively less of an outlier: here the esti-
mates are not significantly affected.
To summarize, these results indicate that emissions reported by facilities in the 
RECLAIM program fell by significantly more over the 15-year study period (i.e., 
1990–2005) as compared to emissions reported by a group of California facilities 
located in nonattainment counties, operating in the same industries, with similar pre-
RECLAIM emissions levels. When we narrow our focus to the window of time sur-
rounding the cross-over point (i.e., the point at which the aggregate cap began to bind), 
we continue to find that emissions reductions among RECLAIM facilities are signifi-
cantly greater on average as compared to the matched controls without the 13 power 
producers. When all facilities are included in the sample and the model is estimated 
using untransformed data, we can no longer reject the null hypothesis of zero difference 
37 Online Appendix B also summarizes results from additional matching exercises. Figure A2 reports the cumu-
lative effects of the program for each year from 1995 through 2005.
38 The estimated average annual reduction in the log specification is somewhat larger than the average reduc-
tion expressed as a percentage of period 1 emissions. This is consistent with percentage reductions being larger at 
smaller facilities.
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in emissions trajectories across RECLAIM and control facilities during this cross-over 
period. However, using log-transformed data, the treatment effect estimates remain 
highly significant over this cross-over period, with or without the 13 power producers.
C. Evaluating the Underlying Assumptions
In order to interpret these estimates as an unbiased measure of RECLAIM program 
impacts, some important assumptions must hold—in particular: conditional uncon-
foundedness and stable unit treatment values. Although these assumptions are not 
directly testable in principle, there are steps we can take to assess their plausibility.
Assessing Unconfoundedness.—First, our analysis assumes that the emissions 
trajectories of facilities in the control group are representative of the emissions 
trajectories that would have been observed at similar RECLAIM facilities had 
RECLAIM not been implemented. The weaker unconfoundedness assumption 
implies that  Y it′ (0) will be distributed similarly within subpopulations that are 
homogeneous in observable covariates. As we have two different control groups 
(i.e., facilities located within SCAQMD exempt from RECLAIM, and similar 
facilities located outside the SCAQMD), we can test whether the assumption 
holds across these two groups. The key to this test is that these two control groups 
are likely to have different biases. The emissions trends at facilities outside of 
SCAQMD may differ from the counterfactual trends of matched treated facili-
ties because they are operating in different counties and are regulated by differ-
ent regional agencies. In contrast, the emissions trends at smaller facilities in the 
SCAQMD may differ from the counterfactual trends of matched treated facilities 
because they have lower baseline emissions.
To conduct the test, we redefine our “treated” group to be facilities in the SCAQMD 
but not regulated by RECLAIM. Our pool of control facilities consists of facilities 
located in nonattainment areas other than the South Coast. If unconfoundedness 
holds for these two groups, the estimated “pseudo” treatment effects should not be 
statistically distinguishable from zero.
Table 5—Indirect Test of Unconfoundedness
Treated
Levels Logs facilities Controls
panel A. Change in NOx emissions between periods 1 and 4
Nearest neighbor matching −0.96 −0.07 265 554
 (base specification) (2.13) (0.06)
Nearest neighbor matching 3.01 −0.05 249 520
 (alternative specification) (2.49) (0.07)
panel B. Change in NOx emissions between periods 2 and 3
Nearest neighbor matching −0.35 0.08 434 642
 (base specification) (1.98) (0.06)
Nearest neighbor matching 0.02 0.01 394 547
 (alternative specification) (1.17) (0.06)
Notes: The treated facilities are redefined to be facilities in the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District that remained subject to CAC regulation on account of their low levels of 
emissions. See Table 4 for additional notes.
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Table 5 summarizes the results from this experiment. We find that the change in 
the average emissions (in levels or logs) among these facilities located in SCAQMD 
that remained subject to more prescriptive forms of emissions regulation is not 
statistically different from that of the control group. Put differently, the emissions 
trajectories among smaller SCAQMD facilities exempt from RECLAIM and the 
emissions at observably similar facilities located in other California air basins fol-
low similar paths. These results are consistent with the weak unconfoundedness 
condition upon which our estimation is predicated.
The stronger unconfoundedness assumption requires that the control regula-
tions mimic the changes in the stringency of regulations that RECLAIM facilities 
would have been subjected to had RECLAIM not been introduced. To assess the 
plausibility of this assumption (albeit crudely) we look at the ozone concentra-
tions reductions mandated in SCAQMD vis-à-vis other California air basins over 
the study period.
Figure 3 illustrates the compliance requirements required under the CAAA for 
five air basins in California. The dotted lines connect one-hour ozone concentration 
values in 1990 (when the CAAAs were passed) with the federal one-hour standard 
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Figure 3. Required Ozone Concentration Reductions for Five Californian Air Basins
Notes: This figure illustrates the ozone concentration reductions required of the five California air basins with 
the most severe air quality problems. Dotted lines connect an area’s 1990 “design value” with the federal one-
hour ozone standard in the year the basin is required to achieve compliance. A design value is an air quality mea-
surement that is used to determine an area’s air quality status (in reference to a National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard). Areas that had relatively high ozone concentrations in 1990 (and high design values) were given more 
time to come into attainment with the federal standard. Compliance deadlines were established under the CAAA 
1990. In 1997, the EPA issued a federal eight-hour standard of 0.08 ppm. This standard was officially upheld by 
the courts in 2001. The broken lines connect an area’s eight-hour design standard (measured in 2001) and the fed-
eral eight-hour standard in the year the area must comply with this standard. Deadlines for compliance with the 
eight-hour standard can be found at http://www.epa.gov/ozonedesignations/regions/region9desig.htm. Historical 
data on ozone design values are available from California Air Resources Board: http://www.arb.ca.gov/adam/
php_files/aqdphp/sc8start.php.
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CAAA, to come into compliance.39 The broken lines represent the more recently 
required ozone concentration reduction trajectories that pertain to the federal eight-
hour ozone standard.40 The black lines (associated with the highest ozone con-
centrations) correspond to the SCAQMD. Because SCAQMD was much further 
from attainment as compared to other air basins, the district was given more time 
to comply. Although ozone concentrations (and thus the extent of nonattainment) in 
the South Coast significantly exceed those of other California nonattainment areas, 
mandated reductions follow similar—if not parallel—trajectories over time. This 
figure helps to illustrate how mandated ozone concentration reduction trajectories 
were similar across California’s nonattainment counties. This is consistent with our 
assumption that changes in the stringency of regulations affecting industrial sources 
of N O x  emissions in SCAQMD and other nonattainment areas would have followed 
similar paths had RECLAIM not been introduced.
39 Under Title I of the 1990 CAAAs, requirements for the 96 metropolitan areas failing to attain federal ozone 
standards were significantly revised. Nonattainment areas were reclassified according to the extent to which they 
exceeded federal standards. Each classification was subject to a different deadline for achieving compliance.
40 In 1997, the EPA concluded that the one-hour standard was inadequate for protecting public health. The 
Agency issued a federal eight-hour standard of 0.08 ppm which was officially upheld by the courts in 2001. 
Deadlines for compliance with the eight-hour standard can be found at http://www.epa.gov/ozonedesignations/
regions/region9desig.htm.
Table 6—Robustness to Control Group Using Nearest Neighbor Matching
RECLAIM
Control group Levels Logs  facilities Controls
panel A. Change in NOx emissions between periods 1 and 4
Base specification −20.59*** −0.25*** 212 1,222
(7.63) (0.09)
Exclude L.A. facilities −23.50*** −0.34*** 210 778
(7.96) (0.09)
Exclude northern CA −26.60*** −0.23** 210 767
(7.58) (0.11)
Severe nonattainment only −21.65** −0.29** 208 475
(7.89) (0.11)
Single facility only −19.92** −0.23** 210 781
(7.60) (0.10)
panel B. Change in NOx between periods 2 and 3
Base specification −8.29** −0.26*** 255 1,577
(3.85) (0.06)
Exclude L.A. facilities −8.49* −0.21*** 247 877
(4.40) (0.07)
Exclude northern CA −14.24*** −0.28*** 255 1,090
(3.90) (0.07)
Severe nonattainment only −13.14*** −0.17** 244 541
(4.01) (0.07)
Single facility only −14.99*** −0.21*** 253 1,027
(4.67) (0.06)
Notes: Panels report results for the base specifications. See Table 4 for notes.
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Assessing the Stability of Unit Treatment Values.—Our analysis also assumes 
that the treatment received by one facility does not affect emissions at other 
facilities. If the introduction of the RECLAIM program caused production and 
associated emissions to shift from RECLAIM facilities to those exempt from the 
program, this would bias our counterfactual emissions estimates and exaggerate 
our estimates of program impacts.
Violations of this assumption are empirically intractable unless we generate some 
specific hypotheses regarding how these violations would manifest. We test three 
such hypotheses using different subsets of the control group to identify the sample 
average treatment effect. First, if the introduction of RECLAIM caused production 
to shift to control facilities, and if this shift disproportionately affected control facili-
ties in proximity, we would expect to find larger treatment effects when the control 
group is restricted to nearby facilities. The first row of results in Table 6 shows that 
dropping the closest facilities in the control group (i.e., those located within the 
SCAQMD) does not significantly affect the results. The second row excludes the 
facilities farthest away (i.e., northern California facilities) from the control group. 
This also has no significant impact on the results.
Second, if RECLAIM induced shifts in production were more likely to occur 
in relatively less stringently regulated regions where the limits imposed by CAC 
regulation are more lax, we would expect to find smaller treatment effects when 
the control group is restricted in this way. We restrict the control group to those 
facilities located in severe nonattainment counties. The third row of results in 
Table 6 reports SATT estimates obtained using only data from facilities in severe 
(versus moderate) nonattainment areas as controls. Estimated program effects are 
not significantly impacted.
Finally, if moving production (and thus emissions) from one facility to another is 
more easily coordinated within a firm versus across firms, RECLAIM induced shifts 
in production will be more likely to occur within a parent company with facilities 
inside and outside of RECLAIM (versus across facilities that do not share a com-
mon owner). In this case, we would expect to find smaller treatment effects when 
the control group is restricted to single plant firms. The final row of results in Table 6 
shows that our results are robust to this restriction.
D. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Next, we ask whether the reduction in emissions that occurred under RECLAIM, 
in comparison to those in the control group, are correlated with demographics. In par-
ticular, we ask whether traditionally disadvantaged neighborhoods in the SCAQMD 
experienced similar emission reductions as compared with other neighborhoods.
Table 7 summarizes the results of estimating equation (4).41 Estimation of the θ 
parameters in (4) facilitates a test of whether the treatment effect is heterogeneous 
with respect to historic emissions, income, and percent minority. We estimate each 
effect separately as well as jointly. Panel A of Table 7 presents the results where the 
dependent variable is the change in the level of emissions from periods 1 to 4 for the 
41 Results using the log transformed values are reported in online Appendix Table A6.
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full sample. In panel B, the dependent variable is the change in the level of emissions 
from periods 2 to 3 for the restricted dataset that focuses on those facilities that were 
participating in (and complying with) the cap-and-trade program during this period. 
We do find that RECLAIM facilities polluting more in period 1 reduced emissions 
more during this time period. However, we do not find evidence of 1990 demograph-
ics being a significant determinant of which facilities reduced emissions.42
In all specifications, the period 1 N O x coefficient is statistically significant. 
Ideally, our within-group matching on historic N O x emissions would be perfect and 
42 We have also estimated these models using the restricted sample for the change in emissions from periods 1 to 
4, and for the full sample from periods 2 to 3. The models have also been estimated using 2000 census data, as well 
as using a log specification. See online Appendix B for a discussion of these results.
Table 7—Environmental Justice Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
panel A. Change in NOx emissions between periods 1 and 4
Treatment −20.64** −20.38* −17.49** −20.46** −18.52** −15.26*** −17.71**
(7.81) (8.85) (6.17) (7.41) (7.04) (4.36) (5.29)
Treat × Period 1 NOx −0.19 −0.19 −0.19 −0.18
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Treat × income −1.27 −0.65 0.42 −0.02
(0.96) (1.09) (1.95) (1.53)
Treat × %Minority 0.94 0.43 1.04 0.41
(0.60) (0.36) (0.96) (0.51)
Period 1 NOx −0.48*** −0.49** −0.49** −0.48*** −0.48*** −0.49** −0.48***
(0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11)
Income 0.10 0.16 −0.66 −0.24
(0.80) (0.74) (1.47) (1.04)
%Minority −0.35 −0.22 −0.52 −0.28
(0.31) (0.26) (0.56) (0.37)
R2 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.87
panel B. Change in NOx between periods 2 and 3
Treatment −6.70*** −7.19** −6.29*** −7.16*** −6.62*** −6.45*** −7.05***
(1.43) (2.22) (1.35) (1.45) (1.25) (1.85) (1.23)
Treat × Period 1 NOx −0.06*** −0.07*** −0.07*** −0.07**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Treat × income −0.16 −0.09 −0.12 −0.22
(0.24) (0.17) (0.36) (0.35)
Treat × %Minority 0.09* −0.004 0.05 −0.07
(0.04) (0.045) (0.11) (0.14)
Period 1 NOx −0.35*** −0.34*** −0.34*** −0.34*** −0.34*** −0.34*** −0.34***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
Income 0.19 0.16 0.05 0.15
(0.36) (0.33) (0.47) (0.46)
%Minority −0.11 −0.05 −0.10 −0.02
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11)
R2 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.49
Notes: Panels report results for the base specifications. For regressions with 1990 demographic data, there are 875 and 
1,043 observations in panels A and B, respectively. Group fixed effects are not shown. Treated observations receive a 
weight of one and control observations receive a weight of 1/ m j , where  m j is the size of the control group for treated 
facility j. %Minority is percent of population that is black or Hispanic. See Table 4 for additional notes.
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the period 1 N O x coefficient would not be identified. In fact, our data are not suffi-
ciently rich to facilitate perfect matching; historic emissions do vary within a group 
of matched facilities. Moreover, we find that this within-group variation in historic 
emissions is significantly correlated with the dependent variable. These results 
serve to highlight our concerns about the bias potentially introduced by poor  match 
quality. All of our matching estimation incorporates a parametric adjustment to miti-
gate this bias (Abadie and Imbens 2006).43
In panel B of Table 7, the variable Treat × period 1 N O x is statistically significant, 
indicating larger emissions reductions at larger facilities. Online Appendix Figure 
A3 helps to illustrate this relationship between changes in emissions and historic 
emissions both for RECLAIM and for other facilities in more detail.44 We smooth 
the observations, separately for RECLAIM and for other facilities, using a k-Nearest 
Neighbor estimator. We see that the relationship between historic emissions and 
change in emissions is decreasing over the range of zero to 80 tons per year of his-
toric emissions. In contrast, the control group is relatively flat at zero for most of the 
range: from zero to 55 tons that accounts for over 80 percent of the sample.
Thus far, our analysis has focused on average correlations between the relative 
impacts of RECLAIM on facility-level emissions trajectories and neighborhood 
characteristics. We might also be interested in the distribution around the mean and, 
in particular, investigating whether any neighborhoods were exposed to more emis-
sions under RECLAIM vis-à-vis the CAC counterfactual. Figure 4 illustrates the 
geographic distribution of emissions under RECLAIM and the CAC counterfactual, 
respectively. We compute the fraction of each block group that is within two miles 
of each RECLAIM facility and then use these fractions to assign emissions to each 
block group. Panel A of Figure 4 shows the RECLAIM emissions assigned to each 
block group by this procedure, and panel B shows the counterfactual emissions 
assigned to each block group. Note that if two facilities are located within two miles 
of a block group, emissions from both facilities are assigned to the block group.45
Panel A of Figure 4 shows that there is spatial clustering of the emissions permit-
ted under RECLAIM. However, panel B illustrates similar spatial patterns of emis-
sions implied by the CAC counterfactual. The preceding analysis has demonstrated 
that, on average, facility-level emissions are lower under RECLAIM as compared to 
the CAC counterfactual. Figure 4 shows that these relative reductions are distributed 
across the entire SCAQMD jurisdiction. This evidence suggests that RECLAIM did 
not contribute to hotspots.
Our results suggest that some neighborhoods were exposed to higher levels of emis-
sions under RECLAIM. Figure A4 in the online Appendix identifies these neighbor-
hoods explicitly. Using a similar approach, we construct changes in N O x emissions 
(i.e., observed emissions less the CAC counterfactual emissions) by block group. A 
very small subset of affected block groups did see a relative increase in emissions at 
43 Online Appendix Table A2 shows that our results are not highly sensitive to this bias adjustment.
44 For each treated observation, we construct a measure of what the change in emissions would have been for the 
control group if the control group had the same historic emissions as the treated observation. This is done by using 
bias adjustments developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006) to mitigate bias introduced by poor match quality. We use 
a quadratic fit (see online Appendix Table A2).
45 This procedure is equivalent to a crude pollution transport model with transfer coefficients equal to the fraction 
of the block group area located within two miles of the facility.
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facilities within two miles. Almost all affected block groups had a net reduction in 
emissions from RECLAIM.46
46 The small subset of block groups that are exposed to higher emissions levels under the RECLAIM regime 
as compared to the CAC counterfactual comprises fewer minority and low income households as compared to the 
average block. Overall, these households are 34 percent white (versus an average of 30 percent); average household 











Panel A. Actual emissions under RECLAIM
Panel B. Counterfactual emissions under command-and-control (CAC)
Figure 4. Actual Emissions under RECLAIM and Counterfactual,  
Command and Control Emissions in Tons of Nitrogen Oxides in Period 4
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E. Selection Issues
Section III describes the unbalanced nature of our panel. Nonrandom selection 
into and out of our balanced panel could introduce selection bias. The direction 
of this bias, were it present, is unclear. One might be concerned that facilities 
with relatively high abatement costs would be more likely to exit a CAC regime 
that offers less compliance flexibility. This would result in inflated estimates of 
RECLAIM program impacts vis-à-vis the CAC counterfactual. On the other hand, 
if a market-based approach makes more stringent emissions reductions politically 
feasible, RECLAIM facilities with relatively high abatement costs might exit with 
higher frequency, thus biasing our results in the opposite direction.
Online Appendix B attempts to assess selection bias by estimating a Heckman (1979) 
selection model, analyzing patterns of entry and exit, and imputing missing emissions.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we exploit some unique design features of the RECLAIM program in 
order to bring new evidence to bear on two important questions. First, did  emissions 
reductions at facilities subject to Southern California’s RECLAIM program exceed 
emissions reductions achieved at very similar facilities subject to CAC regulation 
over the same time period? Second, has the compliance flexibility afforded by mar-
ket-based environmental regulation resulted in more (or less) pollution in tradition-
ally disadvantaged communities?
Our results indicate that emissions at RECLAIM facilities fell approximately 20 
percent, on average, relative to the control facilities over the first ten years of the pro-
gram. These results are robust to alternative matching strategies. During the period 
of great permit price volatility, the results are more nuanced. During this period, 14 
power producers were removed from the program. When these facilities are excluded 
from the analysis, we find strong evidence that emissions among RECLAIM facilities 
fell relative to very similar control facilities. However, when all facilities are included 
in our analysis of emissions trends during this volatile time, the evidence is weaker.
We find no evidence that the estimated relative effects of RECLAIM on facility-
level emissions vary systematically with neighborhood demographic characteristics. 
In particular, we find no correlation between our estimated effects and neighborhood 
measures of income or percent minority. We conclude that no racial or income group 
experienced a significant increase in emissions due to RECLAIM.
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